

YUTING YANG

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Personal Information

Born on 16 July 1990, Female, Chinese citizen.

Education

Ph.D in Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France. Expected June 2020.

Advisors: Prof. Nicolas Treich and Prof. Stefan Ambec.

M.A. in Economics Theory and Econometrics, Toulouse School of Economics, 2015.

M.A. in Economic Development, Vanderbilt University, TN, USA, 2014.

B.A. in International Economics & Trade/English Literature, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 2012.

References

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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary Fields: Environmental and Resource Economics, Energy Economics

Secondary Fields: Public Economics, Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience

TA– Public Economics 1st year masters level (Toulouse School of Economics)	2016 – 2019
TA– Industrial Organization advanced undergraduate level (Toulouse School of Economics)	2017 – 2018
TA– Macroeconomics 1st year undergraduate level (Vanderbilt University)	2013 – 2014

Professional Activities

Visiting scholar

University of California, Santa Barbara	March - June, 2019
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Conference presentations

11th FAERE Thematic Workshop “Energy transition”	Paris 2019
Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis: European Conference 2019	Toulouse 2019
8th Annual Conference of EAAERE	Beijing 2019
24th Annual Conference of EAERE	Manchester 2019
2nd EAERE Winter School	Ascona 2019
TSE Energy Workshop	Toulouse 2019
6th World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists	Gothenburg 2018
Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 10th Annual Conference	Washington D.C. 2018
8th FAERE Thematic Workshop “Environment and Health: An economic perspective”	Paris 2017
4th FAERE Annual Conference	Nancy 2017

Honors and Awards

Toulouse School of Economics

Jean-Jacque Laffont Foundation’s doctoral sholarship	2018 – 2020
GEMCLIME travel grant	2019
French Government Scholarship for Ph.D. Studies	2015 – 2018
Bonus Qualité Recherche travel grant	2018, 2019
IDEX Chair travel grant	2018

Vanderbilt University

Graduate Program in Economic Development Award	2014
Outstanding Student Award	2014

Research Papers

Electricity Interconnection with Intermittent Energy Sources <Job Market Paper>

Electricity interconnection has been recognized as a way to mitigate carbon emissions through dispatching more efficient electricity production and accommodating the growing share of renewables. I analyze the impact of electricity interconnection in the presence of intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar power, on renewable capacity and carbon emissions using a two-country model. I find that in the first-best, interconnection decreases investments in renewable capacity and exacerbates carbon emissions if the social cost of

carbon (SCC) is low. Conversely, interconnection increases renewable capacity and reduces carbon emissions for a high SCC. Moreover, the intermittency of renewables generates an insurance gain from interconnection, which also implies that some renewable capacity is optimally curtailed in some states of nature when the SCC is high. The curtailment rate and the corresponding carbon emissions increase for more positively correlated intermittency. I calibrate the model using data from the European Union electricity market and simulate the outcome of expanding interconnection between Germany-Poland and France-Spain. I find that given the current level of SCC, interconnection may increase carbon emissions. The net benefit of interconnection is positive, with uneven distribution across countries.

Public Safety under Imperfect Taxation (with Nicolas TREICH) *R&R Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*

An important objective of many publicly-financed environmental projects is to reduce mortality. In this paper, we examine theoretically the effect of tax system imperfections on the optimal public investment in mortality risk reduction (or public safety). We compare three tax systems, namely first-best, uniform tax, and income tax. Moreover, we consider several sources of imperfection, namely individuals' heterogeneity in wealth and in risk exposure, and labor supply distortion. We show that the effect of imperfect taxation critically depends on the source of imperfection as well as on the individual utility and survival probability functions. We conclude that imperfect taxation cannot generically justify less public safety. There is thus no fundamental reason to always adjust downwards the value of statistical life (VSL) because of imperfect taxation, nor to assume a marginal cost of public funds systematically greater than one for the benefit-cost analysis of environmental projects.

Do Correlated Climate Risks Induce Lower Emission?

In the context of climate change, the literature generally considers risks as independent or fully synchronized. This paper examines the role of correlated risks in determining the social optimal emission level. Correlated risks are defined as risks that are not independently distributed, but drawn from a joint distribution with other risks. This paper concludes that risks with higher correlation would result in a decrease in welfare and a reduction in optimal emission level when social preference is correlation-averse. When countries face heterogeneous risks, the optimal emission reduction would be proportional to the level of expected risk. In the face of correlated climate risks, cooperation among countries could achieve a higher social welfare level than a non-cooperative game. The modeling framework also applies to other pollution contexts.

Work in Progress

Dynamic Transmission Tariffication (with Stefan AMBEC)

To Trade or not to Trade: Electricity Interconnection under Asymmetric Carbon Tax

Language and IT Skills

Chinese (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate).

Very good knowledge of MS Office, L^AT_EX, Mathematica, Python, MATLAB, and R

Affiliations

EAERE, FAERE, AERE, EAAERE, CAERE, SBICA, EEA, AEA